Barcode technology has decreased transcription errors in many healthcare applications. However, we have found that linear barcode identification methods are not failsafe. In this study, we sought to identify the sources of barcode decoding errors that generated incorrect patient identifiers when barcodes were scanned for point-of-care glucose testing and to develop solutions to prevent their occurrence.
CONCLUSIONS:
Barcode-related patient misidentifications can occur. In the worst case, misidentified patient results could have been transmitted to the incorrect patient medical record. This report has profound implications not only for point-of-care testing but also for barcoded medication administration, transfusion recipient certification systems, and other areas where patient misidentifications can be life-threatening. Careful control of barcode scanning and printing equipment specifications will minimize this threat to patient safety. Ultimately, healthcare device manufacturers should adopt more robust and higher fidelity alternatives to linear barcode symbologies.
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Barcode technology has been an indispensable advancement for patient safety. When used for patient and/or specimen identification, barcodes, combined with the appropriate software, permit clinical staff to instantly identify individual patients and their medications and specimens and have significantly reduced identification and data entry error rates (1, 2 ) . Despite this, there still exists the potential for barcode misreads and patient misidentification. Based on findings in our institution, we estimate that more than 1 in 84000 barcode-scanning events generate an incorrect patient identifier.
We were first alerted to barcode-related errors in our institution when several patients' point-of-care testing (POCT) 4 glucose results were not transmitted to the intended patient medical records. Iterative scanning of wristbands from these patients produced both correct and incorrect patient identifiers. The defective barcodes originated from two different printer models (Datacard Model LBD24-2043-002 and FastMark AMT Datasouth Model 4602), with each printer model printing a specific sized barcode (width by height ϭ 13 ϫ 13 mm or 25 ϫ 12 mm, respectively, where barcode width was defined as the measured distance across the barcode, perpendicular to the long axis of the barcode bars). Visual examination of the problematic wristbands revealed fine white lines in the black alphanumeric text juxtaposed to the barcode. These lines were parallel to and ran through the adjacent barcode bars, splitting a single barcode bar into two bars of variable width. These white lines were observed in all faulty wristbands. Printers responsible for generating these faulty barcodes were either replaced or removed from service for maintenance.
Built-in data integrity checks are essential to ensure the fidelity of the scan in cases where the barcode is misprinted or damaged. Code 128, the healthcare industry barcode standard and the symbology used by our institution, uses such an algorithm (3 ) . Barcodes printed with Code 128 symbology have four parts in the sequence: the three-digit start code, the payload (in our case, a 12-digit patient identification number), a two-digit check character (CkChr), and a three-digit stop code. Scanner software computes the CkChr from the decoded payload and compares it to the printed CkChr in the barcode. If the payload is decoded into a number that is different than what was intended, then the computed check character should differ from the printed CkChr, causing the software to reject the decoded payload number as incorrect (rejection error). However, if the decoded number computes into a CkChr identical to the CkChr computed from the intended number, then the incorrect number will be accepted as correct by the scanner (substitution error). Rejection errors hold no patient safety risks because the scanner does not accept the incorrect number. Substitution errors, on the other hand, are concerning, since an operator frequently doesn't realize that the substitution has occurred. In the work presented herein, we demonstrate that this barcode integrity check system has limitations and that barcode-related misidentification errors can occur. Sources of observed barcode misread errors and solutions to reduce their occurrence are presented.
Materials and Methods
A total of 10 defective barcodes were identified and removed from service over the course of a year. The sequestered barcodes were scanned by three different operators, 15 times each, using five different commercially available scanner models (45 scans per scanner model, for a total of 225 scans per barcode). The five scanners included two laser scanners (Roche ACCU-CHEK® glucometers [RACGs] and Metrologic MS 9540), two CCD/LED scanners (Adesso NUSCAN 1000U and ZBA AS-8210), and one omni-directional scanner (Symbol LS-9100-411 BA). The checksum (CkSum) was manually calculated for each 12-digit payload result using the following formula for Code 128C:
where XX 1 through XX 6 represents the first through sixth pairs of encoded digits in the payload, respectively. The CkChr was calculated as the remainder of the CkSum divided by 103 (modulo 103 CkSum) (4 ).
The manufacturer of the original barcodes reprinted each of the above barcodes in pristine condition to control for defective printing or barcode damage. Each barcode was printed in the same width as the original defective barcode and at a standard 17-mm width to control for the RACG scanner specifications. These control barcodes were scanned in the exact same manner as the defective barcodes (45 scans per scanner model, for a total of 225 scans per barcode). Substitution error rates defined as [(number of incorrect scans/ total number of attempted scans) ϫ 100] for five different barcode scanners were determined for the defective and control barcodes. Rejection error rates, defined as [(number of failed scans/total number of attempted scans) ϫ 100], were also calculated. Confidence intervals were determined by the adjusted Wald method (5 ). Table 1 shows partial correct and incorrect patient identifiers (payloads) accepted for the defective barcodes. As many as three incorrect patient identifiers were generated from a single defective barcode. The misread and subsequently accepted payloads, coincidentally, generated the correct CkChr, thereby evading the data integrity check. Some of the barcodes were interpreted to contain payloads with 7, 8, and 11 digits, rather than the intended 12 digits. Barcode scanners are often designed to read barcodes from a variety of different linear symbologies. Therefore, these events may reflect the scanner's misinterpretation of the linear symbology as something other than Code 128C, such as Code 39 or interleaved 2 of 5, with a different number of digits.
Results
Barcode scanner misreads were not unique to the RACG scanners (Tables 2 and 3 ). Laser (RACG and Metrologic), CCD/LED (Adesso and ZBA), and omnidirectional (Symbol) barcode scanners were all shown to generate substitution and/or rejection errors with the 10 defective barcodes ( Table 2 ). The two laserbased scanners generated vastly different error rates; the RACG produced the highest rates of substitution errors of all scanners tested (maximum 80.0%), whereas the Metrologic scanner was the only scanner that did not produce any substitution errors in this study. Instead, the Metrologic scanner frequently rejected the defective barcodes with rejection rates as high as 100%. The Symbol, ZBA, and Adesso scanners all had similar substitution and rejection rates, falling between the relative extremes observed for the two laser scanners.
Control barcodes, printed in a suitable width (17 mm) for the RACG scanner, were completely free of errors. However, the controls reprinted in their origi-nal widths were surprisingly shown to generate multiple substitution errors, albeit with less frequency than in the original defective barcodes (Table 3 ). In one instance, the Adesso CCD scanner produced an identifier with a previously unobserved 10 digits (barcode 1 in Table 3 ). All control barcodes were free of rejection errors.
Discussion
If sufficiently large, localized barcode printing defects can adversely affect the ability of barcode readers to successfully decode the barcode symbols (4 ). When print heads malfunction, for example, because of normal wear and/or clogging, the damaged print head may not properly transfer heat to the printing media. In the 10 defective barcodes described herein, this type of common printer malfunction resulted in unintentional white voids comprising the width of an individual print head running the length of the barcodes (i.e., parallel to the bars and spaces) (Fig. 1A) (4 ) . To avoid potentially high substitution error rates, the ANSI MH10.8M-1983 (6 ) specification allows any number of extraneous spots or voids in the printed barcode, provided that a single printing defect is not Ͼ0.4W, where a module (W) is the width of the most narrow bar or space in a barcode, and all bars and spaces are some multiple of W. The defect size-to-W ratio can be Partial patient identifiers, including all incorrectly interpreted numbers, are provided for the 10 defective barcodes tested in this study. a XX, characters generated in the specified data position were interpreted correctly. Manually calculated CkSum and CkChr are shown for all barcodes recognized as Code 128C.
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calculated to evaluate the potential for the observed barcode defects to generate barcode misreads.
In Code 128C, each set of two digits is represented by three pairs of variable width bars and spaces, comprising a total of 11W. The total number of modules in the barcode is the sum of the start code (11W), the payload (6 pairs ϫ 11W ϭ 66W), the CkChr (11W), and the stop code (13W), for a total of 101W. For the original defective 13-mm-and 25-mm-wide barcodes, W is then 0.129 mm and 0.248 mm, respectively. The resolution of both barcode printers at our institution is 203 dpi. Each print head is therefore 0.125-mm wide (1/203 in or 0.0049 in), and the respective void defect widths are then 0.97W (13-mm-wide barcode) and 0.50W (25-mm-wide barcode), both greater than the specified 0.4W maximum allowable defect size. Spurious sensing of unintended bars and spaces in the barcodes could be expected given the relative size of these printer errors, with more errors anticipated for the narrower 13-mm barcodes (4 ). This could explain the frequency of substitution and rejection errors observed with the original defective barcodes. The built-in data integrity check system failed to recognize these errors because the incorrect identifiers, coincidentally, generated the correct CkChr (Table 1) . In an initial effort to detect these printer errors before wristbands were placed into service, a thick black line was printed beneath the barcodes (Fig. 1A) . This black line also served to alert staff regarding the need for printer repair. The wristband barcode orientation has since been changed in our institution such that voids generated by defective print heads run perpendicular, rather than parallel, to the barcode bars, to further minimize this risk (Fig. 1B) .
Increasing barcode widths should theoretically reduce the risk of misreads due to printer defects by decreasing the defect-to-W ratio. This also holds true for reducing the likelihood of barcode scanner errors caused by postprinting damage, such as barcode scratches. Nevertheless, unexpectedly high substitution error rates were observed with the longer 25-mm barcodes (maximum error rate ϭ 80.0%) ( Table 2 ). Failure to control for barcode scanner resolution specifications was identified as a potential explanation. The scanner's spot size (width of the tightly focused laser beam used to interrogate the barcode or, in the case of a CCD scanner, the width of the aperture used to collect the light reflected from the barcode) (4 ) and W should be synchronized to minimize the potential for misreads. Based on spot size, the RACG and Metrologic scanners have recommended minimum W values of 0.173 mm (6.8 mils) and 0.127 mm (5 mils), respectively. However, when the scanner spot size is considerably smaller than the barcode's W (W ϭ 0.248 mm for the 25-mm barcodes), extraneous specks and voids may be more likely to be misinterpreted as additional bars or spaces (4 ). After reprinting the barcodes to control for printing defects and damage, the frequency of substitution errors for the longer 25-mm control barcodes (W ϭ 0.248) was much lower than for the 13-mm barcodes, with only one error observed for all 25-mm control barcode-scanner combinations. Substitution errors observed for the 13-mm control barcodes (Table 3) were also thought to be attributed to barcode scanner resolution specification mismatches. The 13-mm barcodes (W ϭ 0.129 mm) exceeded the resolving power of the RACG (minimum W ϭ 0.173), likely contributing to the discrepant error rates observed for the two laser scanners for both the defective and control 13-mm barcodes (Tables 2 and 3 , respectively). All defective barcodes were reprinted in a width closer to the resolution requirements of the two laser scanners (17 mm), and no substitution errors were observed (Table 3) . We are currently working to determine an enterprise-wide uniform barcode width meeting the resolution requirements of all currently used bedside scanners that will be used across all affiliated institutions.
Barcode scanners are often designed to decode a variety of barcode symbologies. The substitution errors in which an incorrect number of numerical digits were generated suggest that the scanners incorrectly interpreted those barcodes (barcodes 2, 6, and 10 in Table 1) as non-Code 128C symbologies. This source of error could be eliminated by restricting barcode scanners to read only a single barcode symbology or a fixed number of digits. However, some barcode scanners do not offer this functionality. This is an important consideration when selecting barcode scanners. Our middleware and laboratory information system require a 12-digit identifier to electronically file laboratory results to a medical record, thus limiting the patient safety threat of these types of errors.
Barcode technology has enhanced patient care by increasing the speed and accuracy of data entry in many healthcare applications. However, we demonstrate that linear barcodes are not failsafe and that mis- 
reads can occur because of printing defects, lack of adequate error detection in barcode symbology bxalgorithms, and/or opto-mechanical acquisition systems. Code 128C, the current healthcare standard for barcode symbology, has a total of 102 possible CkChr. This number of possible CkChr is quite low compared with newer barcode symbologies. Incorrectly decoded numbers therefore have a higher risk of generating the same CkChr as the one that was intended. Code 128C has a generally accepted but estimated substitution error rate between 1 in 2.7 million and 1 in 37 million. At our institution, we perform an average of 70 000 POCT glucose readings per month (average 840 000 per year).
In one 12-month period, we identified 10 barcodes that generated substitution errors on at least one occasion. Based on this finding, we estimate at least 1 substitution error in 84 000 barcode scans. There were a number of issues that clearly contributed to these errors in our case and importantly affected our estimated error rate for Code 128 symbology. Printing defects, lack of adequate error detection in barcode symbology algorithms, failure to control for scanner resolution specifications, barcode orientation, and barcode width all appeared to have contributed in part to the barcode decoding errors reported herein. In this instance, misprinted patient wristband barcodes generated incorrect patient identification numbers, preventing filing of associated POCT glucose results. In the worst case, these misidentified results could have been transmitted to the incorrect patient medical record. For manual patient identification, our institution requires that two unique patient identifiers be applied and used on all specimen containers, patient armbands, and other such items. Contrary to this practice, linear barcodes generally contain only one patient identifier in the payload because of space limitations on most wristbands, labels, and other identifying material, since linear (one-dimensional) barcode symbology is space-intensive relative to newer barcode technologies. In this case, if two identifiers had been encoded into the barcode, the likelihood that the scanners would have incorrectly read and accepted the wrong patient information would have been greatly reduced. If the barcode scanner read and accepted the wrong data, the middleware system should have flagged the information as incorrect when both identifiers did not match a single patient record.
All quality practices are fundamentally challenged by the limitations of the barcoding technology currently accepted as the standard for healthcare (3 ) . Increases in healthcare workload are driving more providers to barcode technology, and the errors we have discovered have profound implications not only for POCT, but also for barcoded medication administration (2, (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) , transfusion recipient certification systems (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) , and other areas where errors can be lifethreatening. Advances in barcode technology have led to the development of two-dimensional (including matrix) barcodes. These barcodes have much higher data density (allowing for more than one patient identifier in the barcode), more rigorous error checking, and higher tolerance for printer failures and damage compared with linear barcodes (19, 20 ) . Adopting these new symbologies will require endorsement from healthcare standards groups to drive vendors to undergo the expense of upgrading their systems. Ultimately, healthcare device manufacturers should adopt more robust and higher fidelity alternatives to linear barcode symbologies for patient safety. 
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